Should the United States prevent additional allies from developing atomic weapons? Although preventing U.S. allies and partners from acquiring nuclear weapons was an important part of America's Cold War goals, in the decades since, Washington has mostly focused on preventing small adversarial states from building the bomb. This has begun to change as countries as diverse as Germany, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, among others, have begun discussing the value of an independent nuclear arsenal. Their ambitions have led to renewed discussion in U.S. foreign policy circles about the consequences of allied proliferation for the United States. Despite the fact that four countries have actually acquired nuclear weapons, this discussion remains abstract, theoretical, and little changed since the earliest days of the nuclear era. Using historical case studies, this book shines a light on this increasingly pressing issue. Keck examines the impact that acquiring nuclear arsenals had after our allies developed them. It achieves this by examining existing and recently declassified documents, original archival research, and- for the Israel and especially Pakistan cases- interviews with U.S. officials who worked on the events in question.
Zachary Keck has written on nuclear issues and U.S. security for the media, think tanks, and U.S. Congress, including over a 1,000 articles on U.S. security with a special focus on non-proliferation and nuclear weapons. His writings have appeared in numerous outlets, including The Wall Street Journal, CNN.com, The Atlantic, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Hill, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and countless others. Keck has been quoted or cited by numerous other outlets including USA Today, Bloomberg News, Reuters, Huffington Post, BBC, Vox, and RealClearPolitics. He has been a researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. For the last three years, Keck has worked in Congress, mostly as a Professional Staff Member for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, including the Subcommittee on Nonproliferation. In this role, he has written nonproliferation legislation- including dealing with Saudi Arabia's nuclear program, as well as conducting oversight over civilian nuclear cooperation agreements. He has also written four studies on nuclear proliferation for the Office of Net Assessment at the Department of Defense.
Acknowledgements Foreword by Graham T. Allison Chapter 1: Introduction Part I: Allies Chapter 2: The Ultimate Betrayal (Britain, 1939-1946) Chapter 3: Stuck in the Mud (Britain, 1947-1955) Chapter 4: Full Cooperation at Last (Britain, 1956-1962) Chapter 5: A Bomb is Born (France, 1945-1960) Chapter 6: The General's Bomb (France, 1961-1975) Part II: Partners Chapter 7: A Nuclear Cat and Mouse (Israel, 1950s-1963) Chapter 8: The Bomb Which Shall Not Be Named (Israel, 1963-1979) Chapter 9: The Bomb from Hell (Pakistan, 1973-1990) Chapter 10: Pandora's Box (Pakistan, 1990-Present) Chapter 11: Conclusion Bibliography Index About the Author
Keck's historical study of countries that have "gone nuclear" could not be more timely or clear: It is a net deficit to U.S. and international security when allies and partners acquire nuclear weapons. At a time when countries are re-evaluating their non-nuclear status, this book explains why U.S. policymakers must prioritize assuring allies and partners of their security without nuclear weapons. Keck's book offers a clarion warning against under-valuing the national security benefits of sustaining and strengthening nonproliferation policies and norms while advancing key geostrategic relationships and national security priorities. -- Lynn Rusten, Vice President, Global Nuclear Policy Program, Nuclear Threat Initiative; and former Senior Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, White House National Security Council
