The past few decades have witnessed a proliferation of economic sanctions, yet there seem to be few examples of sanctions meeting sender states' goals. Under what conditions do sanctions fail to change the behavior of so-called international "pariah states," countries who violate various international norms? This book examines the impact of economic sanctions on target states' trading relationships through social network analysis, a method that has rarely been applied to the study of sanctions. Drawing on UN Comtrade data, Trading with Pariahs: Trade Networks and the Failure of Economic Sanctions shows that the imposition of sanctions can drastically change some states' trading networks, as states either find new trading partners (in the case of North Korea) or feel the sting of the sanctions from key trading partners (like Iran). Trading networks (such as Myanmar's) remain relatively stable over time as key trading partners refuse to impose sanctions. Through the theory of weaponized interdependence, Keith A. Preble and Charmaine N. Willis argue that the success or failure of sanctions to change target states' behavior depends on who imposes the sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the "right" sender states can be successful but also cannot rely solely on policies of isolation to achieve the goals of the sanctions.
Keith A. Preble, Ph.D. is visiting assistant professor of political science at Miami University (Ohio) and a postdoctoral researcher with the Project on International Security, Commerce, and Economic Statecraft (PISCES) at the Center for Policy Research at the University at Albany, SUNY. Charmaine N. Willis Ward, Ph.D. is visiting assistant professor of political science at Skidmore College.
"Keith Preble and Charmaine Willis's Trading with Pariahs is an incisive contribution to our understanding of the effectiveness of sanctions. They have written a fascinating book that delves into the trade networks that three of the most critical pariah states - Iran, North Korea, and Myanmar -- create and exploit to evade sanctions. Using innovative network analysis methods, Preble and Willis show that weaponizing economic interdependence, the primary mechanism by which economic sanctions are supposed to 'work, ' is most effective when the pariah state is enmeshed in trade networks with the sanctioning states it cannot easily change. States with limited trade networks with sanctioning states, and greater adaptability in their trading partners, can mitigate their own pain, and the ability of other states to monitor them." --Justin Hastings, University of Sydney "Through innovative network analysis and detailed case studies, Preble and Willis show how features of trade networks influence the success or failure of economic sanctions. The book provides an important advance in understanding of the ability of countries to withstand economic pressure." --Jordan Tama, American University
