In Rationalist Pragmatism: A Framework for Moral Objectivism, Mitchell Silver draws from a wide array of philosophical fields to formulate a comprehensive theory of ethics. He argues that an understanding of justification rooted in pragmatism leads to practical principles that apply to all those we would recognize as persons. The account bears implications for the nature of selfhood, the freedom of the will, the meaning of moral terms, the power of moral principles to motivate, conceptions of truth, the nature of value, and the use and abuse of abstract moral theorizing. Rationalist Pragmatism develops its pragmatically informed morality in light of prominent ethical schools, as well as relevant topics in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology, including the correspondence theory of truth, inferentialist semantics, motivational internalism, the source of value, and experimental philosophy. Finally, Silver explores concrete moral and political implications of his theory, demonstrating that metaethics can affect positions regarding the morality of personal relations; the treatment of animals; and political assessments of democracy, socialism, and nationalism. Silver maintains that our interest in truth-our rational nature as practical and theoretical beings-forms us as a community of mutually recognizing truth seekers.
Mitchell Silver teaches at the I Can Academy of the Suffolk County Jail after retiring from the Department of Philosophy of the University of Massachusetts in Boston.
Preface Introduction: Ideal vs. Non-ideal Moral Theory Chapter One: The Quest for Justification Chapter Two: Objectivity and Truth Chapter Three: Others Chapter Four: Meaning, Morality, and Social Agreement Chapter Five: Morality's Motivational Power Chapter Six: No Double Standards Chapter Seven: Our Morality Chapter Eight: Political Implications Appendix: Weighing Value Works Cited
Silver (formerly, Univ. of Massachusetts, Boston) offers an ethical theory based on philosophical pragmatism. Pragmatism has always been rationalist. Worthy beliefs require sufficient reasons to justify them, reasons appreciable and sharable by others, and justified beliefs in turn inferentially support conclusions about judging situations and actions. Beliefs about values are no exceptions. Pragmatist ethics expects worthy moral beliefs and judgments to meet these cognitivist standards. Silver argues that neither subjectivism nor relativism, long associated with pragmatism by critics, stands in the way of attaining objective moral truths through reasoning, so long as enough people over a long enough time assess all implications of their conduct. Subjectivism and relativism, like prejudice and oppression, are unintelligent refusals to care about wider consequences. This practical ethics, unlike constructivism or discourse ethics, methodically reaches social agreements for attaining common goals despite shared problems. Pluralism is an opportunity, not a roadblock. Silver then shows how this ethics is compatible with naturalism on normativity, defensible against Humean emotivism, and unaffected by post hoc rationalizings. Politics, for Silver, is the public space for practical reason's management of civic institutions in accord with objective morality. Summing Up: Recommended. Lower-division undergraduates through faculty. * Choice * "Mitchell Silver's new book argues that any account of moral objectivity must incorporate a pragmatic conception of moral justification. The argument is original, interesting, and perhaps even true. Best of all, Silver argues for his position with wit and verve. It was a pleasure to read this book." -- Steven Levine, University of Massachusetts
