Thirty-five years ago Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue established virtue ethics as a major challenger to competing visions of morality, but there is still considerable disagreement concerning which version of virtue ethics provides the best approach. The Supremacy of Love describes and advocates an agape-centered vision of Aristotelian virtue ethics that portrays love as the most important moral virtue, and the goals of love as a partial constituent of every genuine virtue. This structural improvement to Aristotelian virtue ethics-found originally in the ethics of Thomas Aquinas-enables this account to address several controversial topics in contemporary virtue ethics, including why the virtues cannot be used badly, in what sense is there a unity between the virtues, how the virtues benefit the virtuous person, and how virtues provide action guidance. Eric J. Silverman demonstrates how and why a distinctly love-centered approach to virtue ethics should make the view widely attractive in comparison to alternative accounts of virtue ethics, duty based deontological theories, as well as results-based consequentialist views.
Eric J. Silverman is associate professor of philosophy at Christopher Newport University.
Preface and Acknowledgments Chapter One: Foundational Issues Chapter Two: The Nature of Love Chapter Three: A Love-Centered Account of Virtue Ethics Chapter Four: Impartiality, Relationships, and Love Chapter Five: Cross Cultural Implications of Love Chapter Six: Human Nature and Love-Centered Virtue Ethics Epilogue Bibliography Index About the Author
The 20th and 21st centuries have seen a rising interest in virtue theory. G. E. M. Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, Philippa Foot, Julia Annas, and others sought to recover Aristotelian virtue ethics to offer a credible alternative to regnant utilitarian and deontological ethical theories. Silverman's The Supremacy of Love continues this trajectory. Silverman (Christopher Newport Univ.), who is also author of The Prudence of Love, seeks to supplement the recovery of Aristotelian virtue ethics with a secular account of love inspired by St. Thomas Aquinas. This purpose occupies the first half of the book, which offers an exposition of virtue, love, and love-centered virtue ethics. In the second half of the book Silverman claims that this love-centered virtue ethic solves ongoing debates in philosophy concerning action guidance, impartiality, the unity of the virtues, cultural relativism, and the is/ought problem. Given its intellectual acumen, irenic character, and deep recovery of virtue ethics, this book is an important contribution to ethical theory even if one has strong doubts about the intellectual possibility of separating a Thomistic account of love from broader commitments about God and metaphysics. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty. * CHOICE *
